Criminal Law--Homicide by Minor--Degrees of Homicide--Juvenile Delinquency (People v. Murch, 263 N.Y. 285 (1934)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 8 
Number 2 Volume 8, May 1934, Number 2 Article 17 
June 2014 
Criminal Law--Homicide by Minor--Degrees of Homicide--Juvenile 
Delinquency (People v. Murch, 263 N.Y. 285 (1934)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1934) "Criminal Law--Homicide by Minor--Degrees of Homicide--Juvenile 
Delinquency (People v. Murch, 263 N.Y. 285 (1934))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 8 : No. 2 , Article 17. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss2/17 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL LAw-HoMICIDE BY MINoR-DEGREES OF HoMIcIDE
-JUVENILE DELINQUENY.-Under an indictment for murder in the
first degree, the defendant was found guilty of murder in the
second degree. At the time of the crime the defendant was just under
sixteen years of age. The jury was charged that they might bring in
one of three verdicts, guilty of murder in the first degree, guilty of
murder in the second degree, or not guilty. Held, charge proper;
defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser degrees of homi-
cide. People v. Murch, 263 N. Y. 285, 189 N. E. 220 (1934).
Both by statute I and common law, a child under the age of
seven years cannot be convicted of a crime.2 At common law, how-
ever, full criminal responsibility attaches at the age of fourteen
years.3 Such responsibility does not attach under the statute until
the age of sixteen years.4 Today the law conclusively presumes
that an infant over the age of seven and under the age of sixteen
years cannot commit any crime except those punishable by death or
life imprisonment.5 Acts other than those so punishable, in the
opinion of the law, are committed without felonious intent.6 The
Children's Court has sole jurisdiction of such acts 7 on the ground
that they constitute juvenile delinquency.8 A verdict of manslaughter
rendered against an infant under sixteen would be equivalent to an
acquittal. 9 under the statutes as they exist.'0 If the evidence on
the trial is not sufficient to support treason," murder in the first de-
gree 12 murder in the second degree,' 3 or kidnapping, 4 the child
must be acquitted.' 5 If the act committed by the child is one which
in an adult would be a crime not punishable by death or life im-
IN. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §816. In People v. Gardner, 78 Misc. 514,
139 N. Y. Supp. 1013 (1912) a motion for arrest of judgment was granted
after an infant had pleaded guilty and received a suspended sentence. The
indictment was dismissed.
'2 COOLEY, BLACKSTONE (4th ed. 1899) 1229; 1 BARBOUR, CRIm. LAW
(3rd ed. 1883) 569; R. v. Giles, 1 Moody 166 (1834); People v. Teller, 1
Wheel. Cr. 231 (N. Y. 1823); People v. Townsend, 3 Hill 479 (N. Y. 1842).
' People v. Teller, supra note 2, at 231, 232, "But the attainment of that
age (fourteen years) the person of an infant is placed on the same footing as
the rest of mankind, as regards their accountability for crime"; 1 WHARTON,
CRIm. LAW (10th ed. 1896) 85, §68.
'N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §2186; cf. People v. Kaminsky, 208 N. Y.
389, 102 N. E. 515 (1915).
'N. Y. PENAL LAW id.
'People v. Roper, 259 N. Y. 170, 181 N. E. 88 (1932).
'N. Y. STATE CHILDREN'S COURT ACT (1922) §6, subd. 1; People v.
Fowler, 148 N. Y. Supp. 741, 33 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 57 (1914), reversed because
of an appeal taken to the County Court instead of to thq Supreme Court,
Appellate Division. 166 App. Div. 605, 152 N. Y. Supp. 261 (1915).8 Supra note 5.
' Instant case.
"°Supra note 5; N. Y. STATE CHILDREN'S COURT ACT (1922) §6, subd. 1.
' N. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §2382.
"Id. §1045.
"Id. §1048.
"N. Y. PENAL LAW (1933) §1250.
"° Instant case.
RECENT DECISIONS
prisonment, then the Penal Law 1 6 says that it was done without
felonious intent.17 The definition of felony murder in this state is
the unintentional killing of a person by another in the act of com-
mitting a felony or in the attempt to commit a felony.'8  Therefore,
since a child under the age of sixteen cannot be convicted of a crime
which does not amount to treason, murder in the first or second de-
gree, or kidnapping, then he cannot be convicted of felony murder. 19
J. A. R., Ja.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS.-The plain-
tiff's husband and the second defendant are living together in illicit
relations, as man and wife. To them has been born an illegitimate
child. The two defendants hold themselves out to all as man and
wife. The marriage between plaintiff and defendant has never been
dissolved by any court. The plaintiff seeks judgment declaring that
she is the lawful wife of the defendant, that the second defendant
be restrained from using the name of Somberg, that they be en-
joined from holding themselves out as man and wife, and the child
born to them as their lawful issue. Held, declaratory judgments will
not be decreed where there is no necessity for it. Somberg v. Som-
berg, 263 N. Y. 1, 188 N. E. 152 (1933),
Courts of Equity will not ordinarily administer relief for an
invasion of personal or individual rights, but where the invasion in-
volves a property right or right of substance we find many cases
where courts have protected such right.' Courts have repeatedly re-
fused to enjoin the use of another's name where there is merely
an invasion of the right of privacy.2 No such right was recognized
at common law.3 However, by statute 4 today, lio person\ may use
the name, portrait or photograph of any living person for advertis-
ing purposes without his permission. It is to be observed that this
personal right is protected only where it is to be used for advertising
purposes. An injunction will not lie so as to enable a lawful Wvife
to restrain another woman and her lawful issue from using the name
of another.5
"Supra note 5.
11 People v. Roper, supra note 6.
IN. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §1044, subd. 2.
People v. Roper, supra note 6.
'Routh v. Webster, 10 Beav. 561, 50 Eng. Rep. 698 (1847); Walton v.
Ashtop 2 Ch. 282 (1902) ; Edison v. Edison Polyform Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136,
76 Atl. 392 (1907).
'Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E.
4z(1902).
Supra note 2.
'N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTs LAW (1903) §§50-51.
'Hodecher v. Stricher, 39 N. Y. Supp. 515 (1896).
